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1 Introduction 
The concept of privacy has often been criticised for its vagueness. However, its 
notorious ‘open texture’2 is also its strength: thanks to the inherent vagueness of 
the concept, privacy – as a human right – has been able to maintain its capacity to 
remedy emerging limits to law’s regulating function in response to profound po-
litical, social and economic changes, and enormous technological progress. Take 
for example the case–law regarding the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter, the ECHR or the Convention). The rise of modern technology with its 
sophisticated devices for surveillance and information storage urged a heightened 
sensitivity to intrusions upon personality rights and informational privacy. The 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the ECtHR or the Court) reacted by 
broadening its interpretation of ‘private life’, protected by Article 8 of the ECHR, 
so as to include these new forms of interference. When the secularisation of soci-
ety and the ensuing increase in moral freedom of the individual encouraged claims 
of decisional freedom under the label of private life, these also met with success 
when tested before the Court. It stipulated that privacy rights protect free choice in 
sexual relationships3 and ensure legal recognition of one’s sex change.4 The Court 
even found that the right to choose the circumstances of one’s own death could be 
said to fall under the scope of ‘private life’.5 Open texture and the judicial interpre-
tation necessitated by it, were indeed the driving forces behind the development of 
the right to be left alone into a right to control over personal information and to 
live life according to one’s own choice.6 Thus, privacy rights as human rights were 
able to fill in the gaps where national privacy laws had failed to regulate, and they 
stimulated new national legislation. 
                                                          
1  The author would like to express her thanks to all the participants in the seminar ‘Limits of 
the Law’ held in Leuven, 2006. She is particularly grateful to Erik Claes, René Foqué, Bert 
Keirsbilck and Willem Verrijdt for useful comments on the draft she presented there. Addi-
tional research and the final drafting of the chapter took place during a research visit at Co-
lumbia University’s Center for the Study of Human Rights funded by the Fulbright Program. 
2   See E. Claes, W. Devroe, and B. Keirsbilck, “The Limits of the Law (Introduction)”. 
3   ECtHR, 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v United Kingdom. All judgments of the ECtHR can be 
found under HUDOC on www.echr.coe.int.  
4   ECtHR, 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom. 
5   ECtHR, 29 April 2002, Pretty v United Kingdom. 
6   See E. Claes, W. Devroe, and B. Keirsbilck, “The Limits of the Law (Introduction)”. 
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This does not mean, however, that there are no limits to privacy rights as hu-
man rights. The features of open texture and the ensuing necessity of judicial in-
terpretation can, and have in some cases, compromise(d) another function of pri-
vacy rights, their most important function as human rights: the protective, power–
critical function.7 My aim in this chapter will therefore be, first, to explore how 
judges’ implicit views on the judicial interpretation of open textured legal con-
cepts affect these protective limits and, second, to offer pathways for a remedy to 
those limits. 
To begin with, a study of judicial interpretations of privacy rights under Article 
8 ECHR will be undertaken, showing the limits to the Convention’s protection of 
privacy rights. The next section will argue that the limits to Article 8’s protective 
capacity can, at least partly, be attributed to the Court’s minimalist practice of in-
terpretation (section 2), which corresponds to a positivist perspective on human 
rights (section 3). Ways in which a change in philosophical perspective might be 
able to remedy the protective limits of human rights law will therefore be ex-
plored.8 An alternative, constructivist perspective on human rights, in the neo–
Kantian tradition of authors like Rawls, Habermas, and Dworkin, will be proposed 
and its general features outlined (section 4). Finally, I will try to show how the 
constructivist perspective allows for more generous, power–critical judicial inter-
pretations of the privacy rights protected by the Convention and how this would 
influence the concrete outcome of certain cases (section 5).  
2 Open Texture and Judicial Interpretation of Article 8 ECHR 
2.1 The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine  
Article 8 states the following:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well–being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
As shown above, the open texture and judicial interpretation of the term ‘private 
life’ in the first paragraph were key to its success in remedying the protective lim-
its of law. The second paragraph, however, leaves room for interpretation as well. 
Generally, the requirements that State interference is to be in accordance with the 
law and in the interest of one of the public goals listed, are quite clear and not too 
                                                          
7   Ibid. 
8   Ibid. 
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difficult to satisfy. Very often, then, the Court’s assessment of the legitimacy of 
interference rests on the interpretation of what is ‘necessary in a democratic soci-
ety’. On the basis of this phrase, the Court developed the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, which holds that: 
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, 
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a 
‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them.9  
Therefore States enjoy a ‘margin of appreciation’ in determining the necessity of 
certain measures and restrictions, while the Court exercises marginal control over 
this decision. The way in which the Court uses this control, and in which it has 
thus interpreted ‘necessity in a democratic society’, has attracted plenty of criti-
cism: the Court applies the margin inconsistently; exercises less than rigid control, 
and never discusses what exactly the notion of a ‘democratic society’ entails.10 
That, on top of all this, the Court’s interpretation of paragraph 2 limits the protec-
tive capacity of privacy rights as human rights, is what the following case studies 
are to illustrate.  
2.2 The Margin of Appreciation and the Limits of Privacy Rights 
as Human Rights 
2.2.1 Chapman v UK 
In the case of Chapman, a Gypsy woman and her family were prohibited from liv-
ing in a caravan on land she owned, because her occupation of it violated the envi-
ronmental rights of others. This interfered with both her family and private life, 
the Court said, since it prevented her from living according to her traditional life–
style. A margin of appreciation was left to local authorities in assessing the neces-
sity of the interference, as they were “better placed … to evaluate local needs and 
conditions.”11 This margin was to be wide, because planning decisions involved “a 
multitude of local factors” and therefore the Court would mainly examine the 
availability of procedural safeguards to the individual.12 The applicant’s argument 
                                                          
9   ECtHR, 7 December 1976, Handyside v the United Kingdom. 
10  Y. Arai–Takahashi, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Jurisprudence of Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
1997, 16, 41, 61; A. McHarg, “Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Concep-
tual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights”, MLR 1999, 62, 671, 687; C. Ovey and R. White, European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2002) 210; P. Mahoney, “Judicial 
Activism and Judicial Self–Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of 
the Same Coin”, HRLJ 1990, 11, 57; and D. Feldman, “The Developing Scope of Article 8” 
EHRLR 1997, 3. 
11  ECtHR, 18 January 2001, Chapman v United Kingdom, §§ 90–91. 
12  Ibid., § 92, citing ECtHR, 25 September 1996, Buckley v United Kingdom, § 75. 
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that the emerging international consensus on the need for special protection of 
Gypsies (embodied in the Framework Convention of the Protection of National 
Minorities) should narrow down the margin of appreciation, was dismissed on the 
ground that the consensus was not sufficiently concrete as “the signatory States 
were unable to agree on the means of implementation.” On the basis of its exami-
nation of the decision procedure (rather than its unfortunate result) the Court de-
termined that the authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. 
2.2.2 Hatton v UK 
In the 2001 Hatton case, a Chamber of the Court extended the already recognised 
environmental rights under Article 8 to include the protection of citizens against 
noise nuisance.13 Excessive noise from nightly flights arriving and departing from 
a nearby airport disturbed Mr. Hatton’s sleep and interfered with his personal life 
in a thoroughgoing way. Despite the margin of appreciation, the Court deemed 
that  
in the absence of any serious attempt to evaluate the extent or impact of the interferences 
(…) and generally in the absence of a prior specific and complete study with the aim of 
finding the least onerous solution as regards human rights 
it could not agree that the Government had struck the right balance between Mr 
Hatton’s right to private life and the economic interests of the country.14 The case 
was referred to the Grand Chamber, which instead found that national authorities, 
with direct democratic legitimation, are better placed to evaluate local needs and 
that in matters of general policy, the margin of appreciation available to the do-
mestic policy–makers should be a wide one.15 It viewed its own role as limited to 
“reviewing whether or not the particular solution adopted can be regarded as strik-
ing a fair balance”16, rather than the least onerous one. No violation was found this 
time around. 
2.3.3 Fretté v France 
In the case of Fretté v France, the Court accepted that the French refusal to 
authorise adoption by a homosexual man constituted an interference with his pri-
vate life.17 Lacking a consensus between State Parties on these “delicate issues”, 
the Court considered it “quite natural” that a wide margin of appreciation was left 
to local authorities.18 It also referred to the inconclusive evidence regarding possi-
                                                          
13  ECtHR, 9 December 1994, López Ostra v Spain; ECtHR, 19 February 1996, Guerra and 
others v Italy. ECtHR, 2 October 2001, Hatton v UK. 
14  ECtHR, 2 October 2001, Hatton v UK, §  107. 
15  ECtHR, 7 August 2003, Hatton v UK, §  97. 
16  Ibid., § 123, my emphasis. 
17  ECtHR, 26 February 2002, Fretté v France. 
18  Ibid., § 41.  
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ble consequences of adoption by homosexuals, which, combined with the too 
small number of children eligible for adoption to satisfy demand, was sufficient 
reason to exclude homosexuals as prospective adoptive parents. The Court did not 
even criticise the fact that, lacking conclusive scientific evidence, the French au-
thorities had excluded homosexuals on the basis of prejudice alone. 
2.3.4 The Limits of Human Rights Law 
In each of these cases, the Court’s interpretation of ‘necessity in a democratic so-
ciety’ in such a way as to leave States a wide margin of appreciation where gen-
eral policy or general morality are concerned, amounts to a lack of redress for vul-
nerable individuals whose private lives have been disrupted quite thoroughly. It 
seems the Court is not keen on playing the role of pioneer in protecting the inter-
ests and rights of minority group members and vulnerable individuals against the 
power of numbers, economy or general morality. It hides behind the margin of ap-
preciation so as not to make that too explicit. This constitutes a clear limit to the 
protective, power–critical function of privacy rights as human rights. The question 
is why the Court would allow this. 
2.4 The Margin of Appreciation and Minimalist Judicial 
Interpretation 
2.4.1 Arguments for the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
One explanation is that, because of its institutional structure, the effectiveness of 
Convention rights depends on the voluntary subjection of the Council of Europe 
Member States to the legal order of the ECHR.19 Therefore the Court must main-
tain their confidence, which could explain why it feels that it can only expand the 
protection afforded by the Convention by slow and cautious progress on a case–
by–case basis, depending on consensus.20 
At the same time, the Court’s interpretation of paragraph 2 points to a deeper 
conviction about the limited role of a court in a democracy. The Court feels it is 
ill–placed to assess the complex local factors that influence policy decisions21, but 
another reason why it prefers to leave these intact is that “national authorities have 
direct democratic legitimation”22 whereas the Court does not. When Protocol No. 
11 judicialised the Convention’s international control machinery and abolished the 
                                                          
19  See P. Mahoney (1990), l.c. 
20  This explains why it often expands its interpretation of private life under the first paragraph 
in cases where it will not find a violation due to a wide margin of appreciation afforded un-
der the second paragraph. My thanks to Erik Claes for useful discussion on this point. 
21  As it did in the Chapman case for example. 
22  ECtHR, 7 August 2003, Hatton v UK, § 97. 
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adjudicative role of the Committee of Ministers, the President of the Court 
stressed how important he considered this completion of the institutional separa-
tion between democratic powers.23  
2.4.2 Minimalism  
The concerns underlying the use of the margin of appreciation are indications of 
the Court’s implicit view on judicial interpretation, one which closely resembles 
judicial minimalism. In his One Case at a Time. Judicial Minimalism on the Su-
preme Court24, Cass Sunstein describes a pervasive practice within the US Su-
preme Court of “doing and saying as little as is necessary in order to justify an 
outcome.”25 He names several justices who “embrace minimalism ... for reasons 
connected with their conception of the role of the Supreme Court in American 
government.”26  
In general, minimalist decisions are narrow rather than wide, which means they 
try to decide only the case at hand and avoid determining the outcome of 
other/future cases27, which corresponds to the Court’s reluctance to contest policy 
decisions. Moreover, they are shallow rather than deep: “they attempt to reach in-
completely theorised agreements” whenever there is a “possibility of concrete 
judgments on particular cases, unaccompanied by abstract accounts about what 
accounts for these judgments.”28 This ties in with the Court’s use of the margin of 
appreciation to ‘hide’ its real reasons for not finding a violation. 
Minimalist judges favour open–ended standards over strict rules, consider the 
possible consequences an important factor in their decisions and prefer flexibility 
and effectiveness to predictability, among others. As we have seen, the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Article 8, paragraph 2 is also inspired by concerns about possible 
consequences (losing the allegiance of Member States) and the effectiveness of 
the protection of Convention rights. 
Sunstein also argues that minimalism can promote democracy.29 By saying no 
more than strictly necessary, it leaves issues open for political discussion. More-
over it can actively enhance deliberative democracy by promoting reason–giving 
and accountability on the legislative and executive branches, who have to answer 
to their electorate. Minimalist rulings, settling as little as possible, can serve as a 
“‘remand’ to the public, alerting people to the existence of hard issues of principle 
                                                          
23  Speech by Mr Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights, at the 
“Solemn hearing of the European Court of Human Rights on the occasion of the opening of 
the judicial year”, held on 21 January 2005. See www.echr.coe.int (last visited 30 May 
2007). 
24  C. Sunstein, One Case at a Time. Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
25  Ibid., 3. 
26  Ibid., 9. 
27  Ibid., 10. 
28  Ibid., 11–13. 
29  Ibid., 5. 
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and policy.”30 The ECtHR shares this view on the necessity of a strict separation 
of powers in a democratic society and on the limited role of a Court therein.31  
3 The Positivist Perspective 
So minimalism fits the adjudication of the ECtHR much in the way it does that of 
the US Supreme Court. In this section, I will argue that the minimalist reasoning 
behind the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation points to an underlying posi-
tivist perspective on law. This perspective will be contrasted with the alternative 
of constructivism, which holds other ideas on judicial interpretation and has dif-
ferent implications for the protective, power–critical function of human rights 
law.32 
3.1 The Separation of Law and Morality and  
a New Source of Validity 
For a long time now, legal positivism has been the ruling theory of law33 and in 
the debate on human rights, too, it is widely considered “the only important alter-
native to the natural law interpretation of human rights.”34 It no longer looks for an 
independent, a priori source of validity (like a higher authority or a natural order) 
and rejects the idea that moral rights are ‘givens’ from which legal rights derive. 
In contrast, positivism’s separation thesis holds that law and morality are logically 
distinct from one another and thus it must turn to a different source of validity. For 
a positivist, whether or not a law is valid depends upon the way it has come into 
existence. In early versions of legal positivism, like Bentham’s and Austin’s, this 
takes place through a command by the sovereign. More recent versions of legal 
positivism argue that the validity of positive law depends upon convention, on ac-
tual agreements between actual people. Positivism’s most prominent advocate of 
late, Herbert Hart, argued that a legal norm is valid if it can be determined to have 
come into existence in a way that is considered and accepted to be valid within a 
                                                          
30  Ibid., 135. 
31  Much could be said about the Court’s rather limited view of democracy and in part, the loss 
in the protective function could be remedied by articulating a more elaborate view of delib-
erative democracy – see my “Privacy Rights in Conflict”, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts be-
tween Fundamental Rights (Intersentia, forthcoming). Thanks to René Foqué for useful dis-
cussion on this point. In this chapter however, I concentrate on the remedies provided by and 
alternative perspective on law. 
32  See E. Claes, W. Devroe, and B. Keirsbilck, l.c. 
33  R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) vii. 
34  G. Ulrich, “Universal Human Rights: An Unfinished Project”, in K. Hastrup (ed.), Human 
Rights on Common Grounds: The Quest for Universality (Kluwer, 2001) 195–223, 205. 
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certain legal system. If this is the case, the legal norm is treated as a positive, so-
cial fact, exempt from the need for on–going justification.35 
Can human rights be treated as such? For that to be the case, there has to be an 
international legal system within which there is agreement on what is a valid way 
for international legal norms to come into existence.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 27 January 1980 regulates 
the conclusion, entry into force, observance, application, interpretation, amend-
ment, modification, invalidity, termination, and suspension of international trea-
ties, namely international agreements between two or more sovereign States gov-
erned by international law. This Convention consolidates the existence of an 
international legal system as well as the system’s internal validity criteria. It lies 
down the rule that validity of an international legal norm rests upon a State’s con-
sent (Article 9) and identifies the persons who can legitimately act for a State in 
granting that consent (Article 7). The Vienna Convention thus stipulates a positiv-
ist criterion of validity as convention – and as the Vienna Convention applies to 
the ECHR and the Court regularly refers to it in its adjudication, positivism per-
meates the Court’s view on law as well. 
3.2 The Separation of Law and Politics: Autonomous Law 
Whereas for natural law theory, positive law as well as political power originate in 
an independent source of natural law, positivism strictly defines and separates 
politics and law. The law determines form and procedure: it tells us who has the 
power to make law and how they should do it in order for new laws to be legiti-
mate. The controversy over law’s content, and the political power struggle relating 
to it, is seen as separate. The legal discipline becomes an ‘objective’ and special-
ised field of study and distinctively legal institutions (like courts) emerge which 
specialise in the certification of legitimisation.36  
While on the international level a legal system is gradually emerging, the dif-
ferentiation and separation between law and politics is far from complete. Espe-
cially in the area of human rights the tasks of interpretation, application and en-
forcement of norms remain largely with political organs. The United Nations’ 
human rights protection system is completely informed by the balancing of politi-
cal powers and depends on diplomatic pressure for its enforcement.  
The separation between politics and the law has perhaps most fully taken place 
in the institutional structure surrounding the ECHR. The Convention system in-
corporates a legislative (the Council of Europe), an executive (the Committee of 
Ministers) as well as a judicial body (the ECtHR). The aforementioned Protocol 
11 completed this separation by installing a fully judicialised protection system in 
the form of a permanent, professional Court which took on the sole adjudicative 
                                                          
35  Ibid.  
36  P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New 
York: Harper Colophon, 1978) 56. 
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role (previously shared with the Committee of Ministers). With this new Court 
emerged an ‘expertocracy’ apt to legitimate State power.  
Mr. Luzius Wildhaber, former President of the Court, has said that:  
… the fact that the EU Constitutional Treaty provides … for the accession of the EU to 
the Strasbourg Convention System powerfully demonstrates how important it has become 
today for the credibility of action by public authorities to allow external judicial control 
over their compliance with human rights standards.37  
This illustrates, first, how the Court indeed draws a sharp line between its métier 
and that of politicians and, second, how important it considers this separation for 
its legitimising role. The fact that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation rests 
partly on a perceived necessity of strict separation between law–making and poli-
ticy–making, as demonstrated in the previous section, also testifies of the Court’s 
view of law as autonomous. 
3.3 Statism and Sovereignty 
Article 9 of the Vienna Convention points to States, or their representatives as de-
termined by Article 7, as the endorsers of a validating convention. The bulk, if not 
all, existing international law has indeed come about either through States’ sign-
ing, ratifying, and observing treaties and conventions, or their observing certain 
implicit rules of conduct which then become customary law. Thus, a positivist 
perspective on law will be inclined towards the doctrine of statism.38 This doctrine 
holds that sovereign States are the relevant actors in the international legal field 
and the principal subjects of theories of international law. It builds on the notion 
of sovereignty, which entails that a State effectively in control of its citizens and 
territory can freely regulate its internal affairs and can, on its own grounds, choose 
to be bound by an international convention.  
While statism is indeed a predominant feature of international law, in human 
rights it provides for a paradoxical situation. Human rights are typically accorded 
to individuals, but their validity rests upon agreements between States and in most 
human rights documents these States are still considered as the primary subjects of 
petition rights. This makes States at once the most important protectors and the 
most likely violators of individual human rights.  
The 11th Protocol to the ECHR made the right to individual petition automatic 
and mandatory for every State Party to the Convention. This solves the lack of 
remedies for violations of human rights inflicted upon individuals by their own 
States. Nevertheless there is still a concern for State Parties’ continued support for 
the Convention and this plays a large part in the Court’s minimalist interpretation 
                                                          
37  L. Wildhaber, l.c. 
38  For an instructive discussion of statism, sovereignty and non–intervention, see F. Tesón, A 
Philosophy of International Law (Colorado: Westview, 1998) 39. My definition of statism is 
based on his account. 
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of the rights embodied in the Convention. At the core of the margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine is the idea that States are sovereign and their allegiance and trust nec-
essary to maintain the effectiveness of the rights protected by the Convention.  
3.4 Positivism and the Protective, Power–Critical Function of Law 
Now that it is clear how the Court’s minimalism is inspired by a positivist per-
spective on human rights, the link between this perspective and the loss in protec-
tive function must be made. 
First of all, it is because of the Court’s adherence to the separation between law 
and morality and to validity as convention that a loss in the protective function of 
Article 8 occurs. In morally sensitive cases, like that of Fretté v France, it affords 
a wide margin of appreciation to local authorities unless there is a broad interna-
tional consensus and positive law in most State Parties is in fact on the same line. 
In other words, the Court’s adherence to validity as convention causes a loss of 
protection for those who go against conventional morality. 
Secondly, the Court’s deference to local authorities in ‘policy cases’, like Hat-
ton and Chapman, flows from its positivist view on the relation between law and 
politics. Consistent with the idea that its role pertains to the procedural aspects of 
law only, the Court in these cases did not review the content of privacy–restricting 
measures or look for the solution least restrictive of human rights. Rather, it asked 
whether the applicant’s views were sufficiently taken into account throughout the 
decision procedures and whether a fair balance had been struck. Obviously a loss 
of protection occurs between the fairest and a fair balance, as becomes very clear 
from the difference in outcome between the 2001 and 2003 judgments in the Hat-
ton case. 
A third way in which the Court’s positivist perspective leads to a decrease in 
protection afforded by Article 8, is the statism that comes with it. As the alle-
giance of the Member States is needed for the effectiveness of the Convention, the 
Court will not easily offend States and will generally afford them a wide margin of 
appreciation. This reasoning probably applies to all three of the cases described 
above. In this way, however, privacy rights as human rights do lose their power–
critical function: those in power get to decide which rights are granted and thus 
rights no longer set limits to what those in power can demand from or do to indi-
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4 The Constructivist Perspective 
All of this prompts the question of whether positivism is the only viable alterna-
tive to natural law theory for grounding human rights. I argue that there is at least 
one other perspective which does away with natural law theory’s metaphysical as-
sumptions and which offers better prospects for the protective function of privacy 
rights as human rights. This alternative view is constructivism, a perspective that 
is steadily gaining popularity in the human rights debate and whose principal pro-
ponents are John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Ronald Dworkin.39 This section 
will concern the questions of how constructivism (at least the Rawlsian version 
presented here) does away with natural law’s metaphysical assumptions without 
reverting to validity as convention and of how it differs from positivism in the two 
other aspects which make that view vulnerable to loss in the protective function of 
human rights. 
4.1 Validity without Metaphysical Assumptions,  
Validity beyond Convention 
In the face of a plurality of irreconcilable religious, philosophical and moral doc-
trines, constructivism as a perspective on human rights does not present itself as a 
‘comprehensive moral doctrine’ governing every aspect of human life.40 It limits 
its scope of application to the question of legitimisation of political power and 
presents itself as a ‘political conception of rights’. But despite this turn away from 
metaphysical foundations, and in contrast to positivism, constructivism holds that 
objective, universal justification of human rights norms is feasible. 
To this end, it does not seek validity in actual convention, as positivism does, 
but, in tradition with social contract theory, in hypothetical agreements about the 
rules governing the political institutions which define rights and duties. If, under 
certain conditions, reasonable people could be expected, in all reasonableness, to 
agree on a set of rights they ought to grant one another, these rights can be consid-
ered objectively and universally valid.  
                                                          
39  Both Rawls and Habermas refer to Kant as their source of inspiration, while Ronald 
Dworkin, in turn, cites Rawls as a source for his foundation for a theory of rights. Other pro-
ponents of what I have dubbed constructivism are Ingram, Tesón, Donnelly and Scanlon, 
among others, J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2nd ed., 2001); Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1996); J. 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and De-
mocracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); “Remarks on Legitimation Through Human 
Rights”, Philosophy and Social Criticism 1998, 24, 157; R. Dworkin (1978), l.c.; A. Ingram, 
A Political Theory of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); F. Tesón, l.c.; J. Donnelly, Univer-
sal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2nd ed., 2003); 
T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1998). 
40  J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2001) 14. 
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‘Under certain conditions’, because the hypothetical nature of the sought 
agreement or contract makes it possible for constructivism to stipulate conditions 
as to the situation (sometimes called the ‘initial situation’) in which agreement 
must be reached. Constructivism contends that every reasonable person who 
would find herself in this initial situation and repeat the procedure of reasoning 
according to the conditions laid out, would come to similar conclusions. Thus the 
initial situation produces an agreement in outcomes41, and this unanimity creates 
objective, universal validity. For the constructivist, then, X is a right if all persons 
under the conditions of the initial situation can reasonably agree that X is a right. 
4.2 The Moral Basis of Rights and Statism 
In the Rawlsian version of constructivism, the conditions imposed upon the initial 
situation are well–known under the name of the ‘original position’. In the original 
position, contractors have general knowledge, but they are placed under a so–
called ‘veil of ignorance’, which obscures any knowledge about particulars, such 
as their place in society, class position, social status, natural assets and abilities, 
intelligence, strength, race or gender.42 One is not even aware of one’s own char-
acter, ideas of what is good or valuable, or life–plans. In this way, contractors are 
equal in their relative ignorance and in their inability to negotiate a contract that 
will privilege them. 
These preconditions are not randomly chosen. At the basis of the construction 
of the legitimating procedure is the idea of our moral nature as potentially 
autonomous human beings. On the constructivists’ view, human rights are what 
we owe to each other if this capacity for autonomy is to be realised.43 It is thus 
both the basis for and the projected outcome of human rights and any framework 
for human rights must therefore be justified in relation to it. This is done by con-
structing the initial situation in such a way as to embody the notions of freedom 
and equality as the original position does through the veil of ignorance.  
There is a connection between morality and human rights law then, if the moral 
conception of personal autonomy is at the basis of human rights and if that is what 
human rights are to bring about. If constructivism is serious about the rejection of 
moral realism, this basis of rights cannot originate from an independent moral re-
ality or “depend on a particular comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical 
                                                          
41  A. Ingram (1994), l.c., 119. 
42  J. Rawls (1999), l.c., 11 and 118–123.  
43  J. Donnelly (2003), l.c., 14. I will not go into the specifics of the notion of autonomy or the 
capacity for autonomy here, as it would digress too far. For an elaborate discussion of liberal 
notions of autonomy as a basis for rights, see A. Ingram (1994), l.c., especially Chapter 5 
“The Moral Basis of Rights.” Her account of autonomy includes a political component, rec-
oncilable with Arendt’s idea of citizens as co–builders of a common world, as discussed in 
E. Claes, W. Devroe, and B. Keirsbilck, l.c. 
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conception of human nature.”44 Within this perspective, justification takes place 
by reference only to values that can be understood and affirmed without presup-
posing any particular comprehensive doctrine.45 Instead it turns to the socio–
political and historical context which gave birth to the notion of human rights 
from which it reconstructs “certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the pub-
lic political culture of a democratic society.”46 This ‘public political culture’ can 
include political institutions of a democratic constitutional regime, traditions of 
constitutional interpretation as well as historical documents and well–known po-
litical writings.47 The notion of free and equal persons is indeed fundamental to 
human rights. It is literally mentioned in several human rights declarations48 and 
implicit in most of the conventions.49 The notion of personal autonomy, moreover, 
can be reconstructed as the background assumption behind the liberal democratic 
perspective which gave rise to human rights and which attaches so much impor-
tance to freedom, equality and tolerance.50 
While neither positivism, nor constructivism are necessarily accompanied by 
statism, constructivism’s moral basis in the autonomy of individuals makes it less 
vulnerable to statism. Despite the fact that the most prominent constructivist ac-
count of international human rights, John Rawls’ Law of Peoples, adheres to sta-
tism, most constructivists do not. In contrast to positivism, constructivism is “con-
ditioned, but not simply determined by objective historical processes” like those 
which led to our current human rights regime.51 Moreover, as its basis lies in the 
autonomous individual, it will see States as instruments to realise personal auton-
omy and consider the promotion of individual autonomy as more important in 





                                                          
44  J. Rawls, “The Law of Peoples”, in S. Shute and S. Hurley (eds.), Human Rights: Theory 
and Measurement (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 68. 
45  J. Rawls (2001), l.c., § 57. Rawls calls this “reasonable justification”, and to be sure this fur-
thers the protective function of law – see E. Claes, W. Devroe, and B. Keirsbilck, l.c. 
46  J. Rawls (1996), l.c., 13. See also J. Rawls (2001), l.c., 2. 
47  J. Rawls (1996), l.c., 13–14 and 376. 
48  In the preamble of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, in the first article 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the preamble of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and the Duties of Man. 
49  The Declaration of Independence, the preamble of the UN International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the preamble of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, and the preamble of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
among others. 
50  A. Ingram (1994), l.c., 97–99. 
51  J. Donnely (2003), l.c., 16. 
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4.3 Relationship between Politics and Law  
Constructivism endorses procedural rights guaranteeing representative govern-
ment and electoral control, because these rights reflect and also promote individ-
ual autonomy. However, unlike positivism, it does not carve these procedural 
rights into stone, strictly separating the process of democratic law–making from 
the processes of application and interpretation. The idea of individual autonomy, 
present in the public political culture, is not just a source of human rights. Through 
the application and interpretation of human rights, this ideal also continues to 
shape public political culture. For constructivism, the task of justification of hu-
man rights and reshaping society through human rights is an ongoing one. This 
means the thought–experiment of the original position can and should be repeated 
over and over again. Here lie incredible advantages: it leaves room for social 
change and makes sure that  
[when] rights become institutionalized as a central part of political and administrative 
culture, they [do not] lose their transformative effect and are [not] petrified into a 
legalistic paradigm that marginalizes values or interests that resist translation into rights–
language. 52  
This means that the task of justification is not over once rights have been institu-
tionalised. Judges cannot remain concerned only with the question of how a law 
came into being or of which procedure lead to a rights–restricting measure. To jus-
tify their judgment they must also give reasons for why autonomous individuals 
could reasonably be expected to endorse a certain restrictive measure.53 Construc-
tivism does not have the problem positivism has with overriding public policy and 
majoritarian interests, because for the constructivist the question whether some-
thing is a right does not depend on convention but on whether reasonable persons 
in the original position could reasonably be expected to agree to it. Since the 
original position is a hypothetical viewpoint, which can be taken up by anyone at 
any time, and because, due to the veil of ignorance, the parties’ reasoning in the 
original position is identical and the agreement unanimous, it does not matter who 
takes up this viewpoint. This means that judges as well as politicians can justify 
rights reasoning from the original position. 
 
 
                                                          
52  Koskenniemi expresses this fear in M. Koskenniemi, “The Effects of Rights on Political Cul-
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5  A Remedy for the Protective Limits of Privacy Rights  
as Human Rights? 
In this section it will be argued that a change in perspective on law on the part of 
the ECtHR might indeed have an impact on the way it handles open texture 
through judicial interpretation, and that therefore, this shift in philosophical per-
spective might provide for a remedy to the limits to the protective function of pri-
vacy rights as human rights. First, it is discussed whether minimalist interpretation 
like the ECtHR’s would fit the constructivist perspective. Next, these views will 
be applied to the three cases discussed and it will be shown how a constructivist 
perspective urges for different outcomes which honours the protective, power–
critical function of human rights.  
5.1 Does Minimalism Fit Constructivism?  
A judge’s implicit views on judicial interpretation generally makes a difference in 
what Ronald Dworkin has dubbed ‘hard cases’, cases “which cannot be brought 
under a clear rule of law.”54 In such cases, minimalism’s directions are to judge 
narrowly and theorise shallowly in order to maintain the proper role of judges and 
to promote democratic debate. This could be said to fit with constructivism for 
two reasons. First, constructivism stresses the importance of representative gov-
ernment and electoral control, in virtue of their reflection of personal autonomy. 
As judges are neither representatives nor the subjects of electoral control, one 
might argue that a constructivist would want them to judge narrowly, decide only 
the case at hand, and leave more far–reaching decisions up to politicians. This 
would further the protective function of law by ensuring the possibility of contra-
dicting the legitimacy of State action.55 Secondly, one might argue that, with the 
idea of a morally autonomous person at its basis, constructivism has an interest in 
promoting the accountability of the State and that it stimulates democratic by 
judging minimally.56 
It is indeed the case that constructivism values democratic debate and reason 
giving for their autonomy–promoting character. But it would be a mistake to con-
clude that only politicians could and should take part in deliberations concerning 
rights. This would empty the constructivist notion of rights: the essence of rights, 
after all, is that they override public policy and majoritarian interests if these com-
promise individual autonomy in a way which not everyone could reasonably be 
expected to accept. Exactly for this reason, it is judges who decide hard cases, be-
cause, unlike politicians who have to think about their next election, they are not 
prone to give priority to majoritarian interests.  
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56  Ibid. 
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As we have seen, according to the constructivist, a judge can take up the view-
point of the ‘original position’, much to the same effect as if politicians would. 
Moreover, as argued above, there is good reason that she should. A judge cannot 
escape her duty to decide the case at hand and a very good way in which to pro-
mote democratic political debate is indeed to judge narrowly, that is to decide only 
the case at hand. But it is hard to see how constructivism could also prescribe that 
a judge must refrain from offering a motivation for her decision that everyone, in-
cluding those involved in the case, could reasonably be expected to accept. Thus 
minimalism’s prescription of shallowness does not fit constructivism at all.57  
5.2 A Constructivist Perspective on the ECtHR’s Privacy  
Case–Law 
What would a constructivist interpretation of Article 8, paragraph 2, look like 
then? How should the Court judge narrowly but not shallowly? Consider again the 
Fretté, Hatton and Chapman cases, discussed above.  
5.2.1 Fretté v France 
France refused Mr. Fretté the possibility of becoming a ‘prospective’ adoptive 
parent, his sexual orientation being the only reason. The Court accepted this inter-
ference with private life because of a lack of evidence on the effects of homosex-
ual parenting on children and because of a lack of consensus among Member 
States. However, autonomous individuals in the original position, who might turn 
out to be homosexual themselves once the veil of ignorance is lifted, could not 
reasonably be expected to accept this type of discrimination on the simple grounds 
of bias and without any prospect of change, for consensus is, in the end, what will 
matter. This does not mean that the Court should have obliged France to allow 
adoption for homosexuals. But, from a constructivist viewpoint, both France and 
the ECtHR fell short of justifying their decision to exclude homosexuals from 
adoption. If the Court could not find more compelling reasons to deny Mr. Fretté 
the opportunity of adoption itself than a lack of consensus, it should at least have 
urged the French authorities to do so, by recommending that a decent study be or-
dered, or by asking that they keep their measure in review, should new evidence 
arise.58 I believe this would have served the protective and power–critical function 
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of law by questioning a prejudice on the basis of which discrimination is now 
permitted to exist.  
5.2.2 Hatton v United Kingdom 
In the Hatton case, the Court left intact a policy decision which thoroughly dis-
turbed the applicant’s sleeping pattern and thus interfered with his private life, be-
cause it viewed its own role as limited to “reviewing whether or not the particular 
solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance”59, rather than the fair-
est balance that could have been struck all things considered. Despite the fact that 
the State had significant economic interests in upholding the existent flight sched-
ule, a judge concerned with realising each individual’s capacity for autonomy 
would not have been satisfied with the fact that a fair balance had been struck. 
Moreover, one could not reasonably expect parties in the original position to ac-
cept a certain measure if alternatives less restrictive to their personal autonomy ex-
isted. In other words, I doubt that a constructivist judge would have overturned the 
2001 Hatton judgment so easily. 
5.2.3 Chapman v United Kingdom 
In the Chapman case, a member of a minority group was robbed of the possibility 
of shaping her life according to her traditional traveller life–style. Again, there is 
no question that her rights as an autonomous individual were interfered with. Did 
the environmental rights of others justify this interference? Would a person in an 
‘initial situation’, possibly belonging to this minority, reasonably agree to a 
scheme where environmental rights are very strictly enforced so that travellers can 
only live on designated sites? He or she might do so on the condition that suffi-
cient sites were provided. But in this case, the provision of designated sites was 
left up to local authorities, which effectively lead to scarcity of designated sites 
and to overpopulation, bad hygiene, and a lack of security on these designated 
sites. As the dissenting judges clearly state, the United Kingdom’s “legislative and 
policy framework does not provide in practice for the needs of the Gypsy minor-
ity”60, and therefore I do not think this framework could have been the outcome of 
an agreement in the original position. From a constructivist point of view, then, 
the margin of appreciation afforded to UK authorities would not necessarily have 
been very narrow, but  
where the planning authorities have not made any finding that there is available to the 
Gypsy any alternative, lawful site to which he or she can reasonably be expected to move, 
there must exist compelling reasons for the measures concerned. 
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Whereas the ECtHR’s majority in this case only examined the procedure leading 
to her eviction, a constructivist Court would have examined these substantial rea-
sons. This would most certainly have protected the Gypsy minority, in the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe, far better than the standing judgment does.61 
6 Conclusion 
These case studies show that a constructivist perspective on human rights offers an 
interpretation of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, which is more protec-
tive of individuals and minorities whose privacy rights have been interfered with, 
and more critical of the reasons those in power adduce for interfering with privacy 
rights than the Court’s current positivism–inspired minimalist interpretation. 
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